First use of Frontier Model
I was curious when the first use of the term “frontier model” came about and who coined it. It looks like it was originally defined in a joint research paper in July 2003: Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety:
For the purposes of this paper, we define “frontier AI models” as highly capable foundation models that could exhibit sufficiently dangerous capabilities. Such harms could take the form of significant physical harm or the disruption of key societal functions on a global scale, resulting from intentional misuse or accident. It would be prudent to assume that next-generation foundation models could possess advanced enough capabilities to qualify as frontier AI models, given both the difficulty of predicting when sufficiently dangerous capabilities will arise and the already significant capabilities of today’s models.
Though it is not clear where the line for “sufficiently dangerous capabilities” should be drawn, examples could include:
- Allowing a non-expert to design and synthesize new biological or chemical weapons.
- Producing and propagating highly persuasive, individually tailored, multi-modal disinformation with minimal user instruction.
- Harnessing unprecedented offensive cyber capabilities that could cause catastrophic harm.
- Evading human control through means of deception and obfuscation.
This list represents just a few salient possibilities; the possible future capabilities of frontier AI models remains an important area of inquiry.
By this, it seems like frontier models are by definition considered to be dangerous or maybe more accurately that they have the potential to be dangerous:
Our definition focuses on models that could — rather than just those that do — possess dangerous capabilities, as many of the practices we propose apply before it is known that a model has dangerous capabilities.